SUMMARY

The advent of South Africa's mineral revolution in the last quarter of the 19th century also saw the emergence of an Afrikaner working class as a consequence of urbanization. The economic changes since 1886 rendered a subsistence economy and pastoral lifestyle increasingly untenable, while natural disasters also contributed to the material impoverishment of rural Afrikaners. These factors, combined with the devastation wrought by the Anglo-Boer War and the lure of the Witwatersrand gold fields, encouraged migrations to industrial centers and consequently the creation of an urban Afrikaner working class.

As a result of the structural imbalance between capital and labor on the gold fields the Afrikaner workers soon became proletarianized and joined local trade unions such as the Mineworkers' Union. Although Afrikaners comprised the majority of the membership by 1916, control of the union was still dominated by persons of British origin from whom Afrikaners felt alienated. In pursuit of their need to preserve a distinctive Afrikaner cultural identity amidst the prevailing cosmopolitan socio-economic conditions on the gold fields, and with the aim to combat "baneful" communist and British imperialist influences among mineworkers, Afrikaner workers attempted to take over the union's leadership – thus creating their own cultural urban space. This was done when Afrikaner cultural entrepreneurs assisted these workers in establishing Afrikaner-dominated counter-unions such as the "Afrikaner League of Mineworkers" in 1936 and the "Reformers' Organization" in 1938. Given that these developments took place amidst the rise of Afrikaner nationalism the actions by the Afrikaner working class also reflected their need to secure their material basis and expressed their search for a cultural identity in an industrialized and urbanized environment.

A Introduction: Afrikaner urbanization and working-class formation in perspective

The first half of the twentieth century in South Africa is characterised by the rise and growth of its cities. The tempo of urbanization in South Africa was accelerated by about 1920.¹ Although research into urbanization as a sub-discipline of South African historiography was neglected to a large extent in the past by historians, a number of academic scholars were nevertheless attracted to the study of urbanization as a historical phenomenon. One of the early pioneers who attempted to come to grips with the social processes occurring in urban centers in South Africa was William Macmillan. In his study, The South African Agrarian Problem and its

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Historical Development, for example, Macmillan investigated the social and economic conditions that would ultimately lead to the urbanization of rural blacks and whites.

The groundbreaking studies by the American historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, which boldly rejected the Turnerian frontier hypothesis and asserted the importance of the city in American history, had a strong influence on South African scholars who also ventured into the historiography of urbanization. According to Schlesinger, the American countryside was transformed from a simple agrarian society into a highly complex urban society. Although this occurred on a smaller scale than in the United States, similar processes in South Africa initiated huge urban-bound trek movements of its population.

The processes and social and economic consequences of this large-scale urbanization of rural whites has also intrigued the Afrikaner intelligentsia. A number of prominent Afrikaner academics, such as economists, sociologists and theologians, compiled the five-volume Report of the Carnegie Commission on the Poor White Problem in South Africa. According to Van Jaarsveld, the Report was influenced by the American experience in this regard. And in 1947 a conference was organized by the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) to discuss the ramifications of the urbanization of rural Afrikaners.

In recent times no-one did more to promote the study of urban history among Afrikaans-speaking historians than the eminent scholar in this field, Floris van Jaarsveld. He has written widely on the historiography and methodology of urban history, as well as on the urbanization of Afrikaners, but did not himself produce any major work on the history of an urban centre. In a collection of articles and other publications, however, Van Jaarsveld mapped out the terrain of the new sub-field and first brought to the attention of his fellow Afrikaner historians the exciting new work being done in the field of urban history abroad. Partly as a result of his initiative a two-part history of Afrikaners and their migration to and settlement on the Witwatersrand appeared in 1978 and 1986.

Following Schlesinger’s views on the process of American urbanization Van Jaarsveld asserts that Afrikaners were also born in the countryside but migrated towards the cities, thus becoming transformed from a rural people consisting of farmers into an urban population. The urban migration of rural whites was, in essence, an urban migration of Afrikaners. The 1947 conference of the DRC also came to the conclusion that three-quarters of urbanized Afrikaners were workers. Therefore Afrikaner urbanization was a cardinal social prerequisite for the emergence of an Afrikaner working class.

Hermann Giliomee refers to the cultural and psychosocial fears of the newly proletarianized Afrikaners and argues that the dislocation brought about by rapid urbanization instilled in them a deep sense of insecurity. According to Giliomee, the poor urban Afrikaners responded by forming a vibrant community that had moved beyond the depths of despair. They had settled down by organizing their communities around Afrikaans schools and churches. The education of their children, the establishment of church congregations, their close connection with their rural origin and lifestyle, as well as the necessity to fulfill themselves again with pride
and self esteem, were important issues for these Afrikaners. Similarly, Afrikaner workers were eager to add a cultural dimension to trade unions in which they could feel at home as Afrikaners therefore creating their own cultural urban space.

However, many studies on Afrikaner political and socio-economic history during the 1930s and 1940s deal with the Afrikaner working class only in terms of its being an ethnic fraction in the mobilization of Afrikaners toward a nationalist unity and not as a class per se. The intricacies of the delicate interplay between urbanized Afrikaner working class ideals and Afrikaner ethnic and nationalist sentiments in this period are to a large extent either ignored or neglected. Up to now, these points of view were rarely challenged but rather accepted as orthodoxy on Afrikaner nationalism, ethnicity and cultural identity. This paper investigates how a fraction of a newly proletarianized and urbanized working class with their rural cultural background responded to the challenges posed to them in an alien urban environment. The paper also challenges the assumption, expressed in nationalist historiography, that the Afrikaner working class, in particular Afrikaner miners, necessarily regarded themselves as an integral part of the organic unity of a monolithic Afrikanerdom. It will propose, on the contrary, that in certain instances these miners pursued their class interests rather than ethnic considerations. It also poses the following central question: What role did class and Afrikaner class-consciousness play in structuring and organizing Afrikaner mineworkers?

B Urbanization and the emergence of an Afrikaner working class

The discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886 resulted in the economic balance in South Africa tilting towards the interior, where cities such as Kimberley and Johannesburg were founded. The structural changes that took place in South Africa between 1870 and 1900, transforming the country’s economy from one based on subsistence agriculture to one based on capitalist mining to a great extent, determined the modern history of Afrikaners in mining cities such as Johannesburg. The settlement of Afrikaners in Johannesburg was the result of these structural changes as the mining economy provided the impetus that would lead to gradual industrialization and subsequent urbanization.

The discovery of gold and the boom that followed lured thousands of diggers, miners, traders, adventurers, agents and speculators. Among them were Africans, skilled British miners and rural Afrikaners. Van Jaarsveld asserts that Afrikaner migration had commenced substantially by 1890. By 1896 there were approximately 7000 Afrikaners in Johannesburg. Between 1904 and 1936 the number of Afrikaners in urban areas quintupled. At the beginning of the 20th century a mere 10 per cent of the total Afrikaner population lived in urban areas, 29 per cent by 1911, 41 per cent by 1926 and 50 per cent by 1936. According to Abel Coetzee, 70 000 Afrikaners left the rural areas permanently for the cities between 1911 and 1921. In becoming urbanized workers these Afrikaners lost their distinctive rural identity.

Various factors were responsible for this large-scale urban migration – which Van Jaarsveld refers to as the rural Afrikaners’ last Great Trek particularly to the Witwatersrand gold fields, with Johannesburg as central locus of gravity. The economic changes unleashed by the mineral revolution rendered a subsistence economy and pastoral lifestyle increasingly untenable.
Firstly, rural agricultural conditions became unfavorable. As new land for occupation gradually became scarcer, pastoralists no longer had the option of trekking to sparsely populated regions. Therefore a class of Afrikaner poor whites or *bywoners* (share-croppers) soon emerged, who attempted subsistence stock farming on small unproductive pieces of land or share-cropping for wealthier landowners. These *bywoners* became early victims of the growing commercialization of agriculture and the capitalist restructuring of farm production in the Transvaal hinterland as these processes led to the eviction of the *bywoners*. In addition, the practice of subdividing and fragmenting a deceased farmer's estate among his heirs often transformed large farms into small and uneconomic units for subsistence agriculture. The owners of these small tracts of land were incapable of generating and accumulating sufficient capital through their own efforts to obtain additional land for more productive farming. They rather sold off their land and moved to the cities in search of a better economic future.

With their colonial legacy that for generations had associated all menial work with slaves and blacks, many landless white *bywoners* were unable to overcome their prejudices against such work and rather became dependent on wealthier relatives or moved to the cities. Many of these landless Afrikaners also reverted to transport-riding, which, in the wake of the diamond and gold fields’ ever-increasing transportation needs, created lucrative business opportunities. However, the completion of the various railroad links to the Witwatersrand by 1892 virtually destroyed this economic enterprise.

Natural disasters aggravated their precarious rural economic situation. The devastating effects of the rinderpest epidemic of 1896-7 was a major factor in stimulating large-scale migration of rural Afrikaners to the Witwatersrand. As millions of cattle died, many of these Afrikaners lost their means of subsistence. Droughts, locusts and other cattle diseases also contributed to their economic deprivation. Finally, the tremendous devastation of Afrikaner farms and homesteads wrought by the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, to be followed by the post-war depression of 1904-9 and the Great Depression of 1929-33, provided important stimuli for urban migration. The net effect of these unfavorable conditions was the increasing material impoverishment of rural Afrikaners. By 1931 most of the 300 000 whites (or one-sixth of the white population) classified as "very poor" by the Report of the Carnegie Commission on the Poor White Problem in South Africa were Afrikaans speakers. According to Solly Sachs, a renowned socialist trade union leader, the poor white problem was in fact a “poor Afrikaner” problem as the number of non-Afrikaners among poor whites was always insignificant. Poverty was the paramount driving force behind the Afrikaner farmers’ urban trek to the gold fields in particular in search of better economic opportunities. The availability of better social services for the poor in the cities, such as free hospitals, schools and clinics, also offered an alluring alternative to the countryside.

These new city dwellers were, however ill-equipped to meet the demands of an urban environment. According to Haasbroek, they experienced the social effects of urbanization as a “painful dislocation” from their previous way of life. The Afrikaners’ agrarian lifestyle, their disdain for manual labor and the lack of educational facilities and industries in rural areas offered no opportunities to develop,
for instance, industrial skills; they possessed only farming skills. The Afrikaners in Johannesburg therefore could not compete with Uitlanders (European immigrants) for skilled jobs and found themselves at a huge occupational disadvantage. For the most part they were only competent to do unskilled manual labor. Consequently, the majority of these Afrikaners were unable to secure fixed employment and slowly slid into becoming a new, white, industrial lumpenproletariat. In the political sphere the former civil servants of Kruger’s Republic were also denied their previous jobs after the Anglo-Boer War by the British military regime. These occupational disadvantages, combined with a huge unemployment problem in Johannesburg during 1897-8, as well as a rising post-war white birth rate, served to perpetuate and aggravate the formerly rural Afrikaners’ impoverishment and unemployment on the Witwatersrand.\(^33\)

As one of the largest employers of labor in South Africa, the gold mines in particular drew the attention of many unemployed, newly urbanized Afrikaners looking for unskilled and semi-skilled job opportunities.\(^34\) But the mining of gold on the Rand entailed large-scale and complex capital intensive industrial production. Only big capitalist mining houses were financially capable of undertaking such ventures. In addition, this industrial production required a considerable number of skilled industrial workers. As there were virtually no such workers in South Africa at the time of the discovery and initial development of the gold fields, they had to be imported from Europe and countries with European settlements. According to Frederick Johnstone this particular system of gold production and the system of ownership of the means of production had the effect of proletarianizing an increasing number of whites, especially newly urbanized, unskilled Afrikaners. Increasingly separated from ownership of or free access to property in the means of gold production they were compelled to subsist through selling their labor power in exchange for wages as workers in the employment of the owners of such property.\(^35\)

Thus the proletarianization of the newly urbanized Afrikaners would lead to a process of class formation and the emergence of a wage-earning Afrikaner working class.\(^36\) Most (white) workers, skilled and unskilled, lived in working-class accommodation close to the point of production in early Johannesburg. In these working-class suburbs several elements of late nineteenth-century British working-class culture and labor traditions were produced, reproduced and accentuated,\(^37\) which would also contribute towards fostering a sense of class consciousness among Afrikaner workers.\(^38\)

C The Afrikanerization of the Mine Workers’ Union

Many white working-class histories and studies\(^39\) erroneously ascribe Afrikaner workers’ first large-scale entry into the mining industry to the failed miners’ strike of 1907 when roughly 2000 to 3000 jobless Afrikaners\(^40\) were employed as scab labor to replace striking professional miners from abroad.

However, Elaine Katz convincingly challenged this assertion in her analysis and definition of the job categories implied by the term “miner”. She argues that by the beginning of 1907 Afrikaners comprised roughly 17 per cent of the total white workforce on the gold mines and that these Afrikaners represented nearly one third of a discrete category of skilled underground workmen, namely miners. Supervision of
black workers and specialization of underground work whittled away the professional miners’ all-round practical skills. This paved the way for the employment of less fully trained men, particularly Afrikaners. A “specialist” knowledge, confined solely to drilling and blasting, was sufficient to earn them blasting certificates through their own initiative and so to qualify them to become supervisors.

Between 1902 and 1904 F.H.P. Creswell, a mine manager, conducted a “white labor experiment” on a number of mines as he was convinced that unskilled whites were more efficient than their black counterparts. This came about because the post-war labor scarcity was particularly acute as many thousands of black miners withheld their labor, principally because of wage reductions. In addition, there was a growing shortage of overseas professional miners, especially from 1904 onwards, at a time when the industry was expanding strongly after its initial post-war stagnation. The devastating impact of silicosis on the overseas miners was also a deciding factor in the entry of Afrikaner miners into the industry. Many overseas professional miners were no longer attracted to the Witwatersrand, because of its notorious reputation as a silicosis-stricken mining camp. Mine owners believed it was cheaper to train and employ an abundant supply of short-term Afrikaner miners than to implement the costly preventive measures, especially ventilation, necessary to eliminate silicosis. In short, Afrikaners filled the vacancies created by the ravages of silicosis.

Even as early as 1897 a few hundred jobless and unskilled Afrikaners were taken on by certain prominent mining groups as part of a poor relief scheme. And by 1904 Rand Mines Ltd. employed 445 unskilled whites on a monthly average of which 60 per cent were Afrikaners. Despite the fact that the 1907 strike aggravated unemployment among professional miners, it also created an opportunity for the incorporation of growing numbers of unskilled Afrikaner workers into the mines. After the strike mine owners actively launched a campaign to recruit Afrikaner miners as they believed that the latter would be more docile in responding to their demands and conditions than the overseas miners were. They were also convinced that Afrikaner supervision would increase the productivity of black laborers and that a permanent Afrikaner labor component on the mines would eventually replace the floating overseas work force.

Most of the skilled overseas professional miners in South Africa at the turn of the century came from Britain. Therefore the predominantly British character of these miners, the habits of the British workshop and the tradition of the British trade unions established themselves on the Witwatersrand. In 1902 the Transvaal Miners’ Association (TMA) was established in Johannesburg. The majority of its members were of British descent, especially from Cornwall, Durham and Northumberland. After the miners’ strike of 1913 the TMA was renamed the South African Mine Workers’ Union, also known as the Mine Workers’ Union (MWU).

The increased Afrikaner presence on the gold mines, which started to dilute the original British character of the mining industry inevitably brought them into much closer contact and competition with the English-speaking workers and their well-developed tradition of trade unionism and labor organization. According to Charles van Onselen, the British miner was no particular friend of the Afrikaner unemployed who looked towards the mines for job opportunities as the latter could become a threat to the job security of the miners.
The flow of Afrikaners into mining was accelerated by the 1911 Mines and Works Act which created a job color bar that reserved certain skilled and semi-skilled jobs for whites. Although initially Afrikaner miners stood aloof from organized labor and were not involved in any trade union leadership, many took part in the 1913 miners’ strike and the 1914 general strike, demanding better working conditions and wages. Consequently, many of these Afrikaners were gaolled for their involvement in the strikes. These actions were indicative of a gradual but growing awareness of an Afrikaner working-class consciousness.

World War One saw a continuation of the increasing Afrikanerization of the white labor contingent on the gold mines. At the outbreak of the war in 1914 thousands of loyal English-speaking miners volunteered for the British war effort, thus creating a shortage of white miners. Many Afrikaners who did not share these pro-war sentiments, took their places on the mines. By 1916 they comprised the majority of white miners and by September 1916 approximately one in every 15 adult Afrikaner males was employed on the gold mines. By the end of the war these workers formed about 75 per cent of the white labor force of the gold mines, compared with about 40 per cent at the start of the war. These figures reflect the gradual transformation of the white working class on the mines into one that consisted predominantly of Afrikaners, mining was thus one of the major drawing-cards in the urbanization of rural Afrikaners in the early twentieth century.

Afrikaner miners felt estranged from the British labor institutions on the Witwatersrand over which they had no influence. Towards the end of World War One they started to realize that many English-speaking miners would return from the front to reclaim their former positions on the mines. Thus they began to contemplate an independent labor organization that would also cater for the distinct cultural and language needs of the Afrikaner working class. In 1917 Ons Vaderland, a Nationalist, pro-Afrikaner working-class newspaper, expressed the view that the time was ready for Afrikaner miners to use their numbers to strengthen and assert their power.

Sachs aptly described the growing cleavage between Afrikaners and the British-orientated labor organizations:

“The masses of Afrikaner people, in spite of their ever-increasing poverty, were neither attracted to the Labour movement nor did they seek entry. They looked upon Trade Unions and the Labour Party as foreign organisations, and the workers’ organisations looked upon the Afrikaner people with an air of disdain…”

The Afrikaner miners were, however, notably divided on the issue of a distinct Afrikaner union. On the one hand, a moderate group was of the opinion that the MWU should be supported. They believed that the English-speaking miners would
eventually take a more pro-South African stand. Constant tension between an Afrikaner union and the MWU would only be exploited by the Chamber of Mines, which represented the interests of the mining houses. Seeing that Afrikaner miners already constituted the majority of the MWU membership, the moderates believed that constitutional changes to the membership rules would eventually ensure Afrikaner control of the union.

On the other hand, the hardliners objected to the MWU’s “extremist” and “socialist” methods in using strikes and violence to further its cause as these methods were considered to be un-Christian and alien to Afrikaner ethics. They argued that the union management consisted only of English-speaking supporters of the South African Labor Party (SALP), which espoused implacable imperialist and anti-Afrikaner views. Afrikaners should therefore desist from joining both the MWU and the SALP and rather form their own organization. Consequently, a commission was formed, with the support of the National Party (NP), to decide on the most appropriate option.

However, the hardliners took matters into their own hands and established the Algemene Afrikaanse Werkersvereniging (General Afrikaans Workers’ Society) in August 1917. Although its name was soon changed to the Zuid-Afrikaanse Werkers Bond (South African Workers’ League), it was not plain sailing for the organization. Many Afrikaner workers who supported the Bond would not relinquish their ties with the MWU. For instance, E.S. Hendriksz, a founder member of the Bond, was also assistant general secretary of the MWU. In March 1921 the Bond issued a futile ultimatum to Afrikaner workers to relinquish their membership of the MWU and join the Bond. Very few heeded the call. In addition, the Chamber of Mines refused to recognize the Bond as a trade union and the MWU threatened to dismiss those who joined this Afrikaner workers’ organization. Furthermore, the Bond was not meant to be a workers’ organization for miners only but rather a general workers’ union. Indeed, the majority of its founders and promoters were not miners. And many of its adherents were Nationalists who constantly tried to misuse the Bond for the NP’s political propaganda.

By the end of 1921 the Bond had become defunct and the MWU was once more the only labor organization for Afrikaner miners. But conditions within the union were apparently still not sympathetic towards Afrikaners. English-speaking miners objected to E.S. Hendriksz’s election as general secretary of the MWU in 1922 and a new election was called. Due to a substantial absentee vote J. Cowan, an English miner, was elected general secretary to Hendriksz in the second ballot despite the Afrikaner majority of the MWU membership.

The election result was a huge disillusionment for Afrikaner workers who assumed that their numerical dominance of the union’s membership would be sufficient to ensure the election of a general secretary from their own ranks. A complainant wrote to Ons Vaderland about the domination of the MWU management by an English-speaking minority and about the “moral defeat” of Afrikaner miners being led by English representatives. Consequently, a new pro-Afrikaner counter-labor organization, the Suid-Afrikaanse Werkersunie (South African Workers’ Union), or SAWU, was established in October 1922 with Hendriksz as a member of the executive committee. Structured similarly to its predecessor, the Bond, as a general
union rather than a union specifically for miners, the SAWU catered for all white (Afrikaner) workers. Based on a pro-Christian foundation, the organization aimed at countering the MWU by means of anti-socialist and anti-communist propaganda through press statements. In an article published in Ons Vaderland in 1922 the SAWU, which appears to have vanished into obscurity by 1924, 67 maintained that the only hope for industrial peace was mutual consensus on the recognition of rights between employer and employee and that such agreement could only be enforced by a powerful (labor) organization. The SAWU claimed that the international socialist elements (within the MWU) had nothing in common with the Afrikaner worker, but only used him as a useful tool for its own ends. 68 Therefore the “unholy” doctrines of socialism and communism were regarded as anathema to the Christian principles of the Afrikaner worker.

Thus, contrary to Lis Lange’s argument that there was a growing class-solidarity among Afrikaner and English workers between 1906 and 1922, 69 the foregoing developments rather suggest, at least as far as the Witwatersrand’s white mining population was concerned, the growth of a distinct Afrikaner working-class consciousness and a sense of cultural difference from English-speaking workers.

The next attempt by Afrikaners to take control of the MWU, albeit a protracted but ultimately successful struggle, took place at the height of Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s – a period regarded by some historians as the era of aggressive Afrikaner nationalism. Afrikaner nationalism in this period is seen in general terms as a broad socio-economic response to the uneven development of capitalism in South Africa, which meant among other things that a substantial number of Afrikaners were left behind economically. It was within the context of increasing urbanization and secondary industrialization during this period, as well as the continuing British imperial influence in South Africa, that Afrikaner nationalism made headway.

The period also coincided with the centenary celebration of the Great Trek in 1938, which paralleled the economically driven urban migration of Afrikanerdom during a debilitating depression which had reduced large numbers to the ranks of poor whites. The 1938 celebrations served as a powerful binding agent and represented a truly unique moment of cross-class ethnic mobilization. The celebrations climaxed in urban centres, such as Cape Town, Pretoria and Johannesburg, which at that time already harbored large concentrations of urbanized Afrikaners. In addition, the period coincided with the launching of cooperative economic ventures, involving the small man in the street and ultimately culminating in the Afrikaner-based NP’s political victory in the general election of 1948. Against this background young individuals from the middle-class Afrikaner intelligentsia and imbued with an idealistic purpose to unite rural and urban, rich and poor Afrikaners under the banner of ethnic Afrikaner nationalism, became involved with the Afrikaner working class, inter alias the miners. 70

In October 1936 the Nasionale Raad van Trustees (National Council of Trustees), or NRT, was established by young middle-class Afrikaner intellectuals under the leadership of Dr. Albert Hertzog, son of the founder of the NP, General J.B.M. Hertzog. 71 The founding members were all part of the Afrikaner elite and members of the Afrikaner Broederbond (Afrikaner Brotherhood), or AB, but none were miners. 72 These developments coincided with the culturally estranged position of Afrikaner
miners in the 1930s. The main object of the NRT was to organize the working class under the wing of a broader Afrikanerdum. Having spent eight years on studies abroad, especially in Britain, Albert Hertzog realized the potential and political significance of the emerging working class. Because the greatest number of the Afrikaner labor force were concentrated in the mining industry – by the 1930s almost 90 per cent of all white miners on the Witwatersrand were Afrikaans-speaking – they obviously became the NRT’s paramount focus. Consequently, the Afrikanerbond van Mynwerkers (Afrikaner League of Mineworkers), or ABM, was established in November 1936.

The underlying reasons for the founding of the ABM were twofold. On the one hand, its inception took place against the background of the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party (Purified Nationalist Party), or GNP, the SALP and the United Party (UP) vying for the political support of the Afrikaner working class. The GNP and its Afrikaner-orientated allies, the AB, the NRT and Afrikaner churches, understood the key position of the Afrikaner miners in the economically strategic gold-mining industry. Membership of the MWU was not compulsory and many of the Afrikaner miners were not members of the union. They were either oblivious of any grievances towards the MWU or they mostly remained aloof from trade unionism. In their poverty-stricken urban existence their interests barely reached beyond their daily struggle for survival.

For the Afrikaner cultural brokers, however, these miners had to be weaned from possible susceptibility to “alien influences” in institutions such as the MWU and the SALP, which were dominated by English speakers. They were also convinced that the Trades and Labor Council (T&LC), a coordinating trade union federation to which the MWU was affiliated, was a menace to Afrikaner miners. Therefore these miners had to be mobilized against “baneful” communist influences within the T&LC, whose non-racial affiliation policies could undermine Afrikaner workers’ position in the mines in favor of blacks.

On the other hand, there were also union-related motives behind the formation of the ABM. There were many grievances and reputed grievances among miners regarding the general working conditions on the mines. As the only officially recognized union, the MWU was the sole conduit through which such grievances could be aired. The union, however, was weak and inefficient, and (in the eyes of the workers) it made no concrete efforts to improve their working conditions and further their interests. The general feeling was that the MWU executive collaborated with the Chamber of Mines to keep the economic standard of the miners at a low level.

The Chamber’s practice, supported by the MWU, of actively recruiting skilled labor abroad rather than employing Afrikaners was regarded as a gross form of economic repression. Profitable and less dangerous work was allegedly reserved for non-Afrikaners. Virtually all less profitable underground work was done by Afrikaner miners, who lived in extreme poverty. Under these conditions many miners became easy victims of phthisis, which shortened their life expectancy substantially. In addition, the pension fund for underground miners was inadequate and the MWU executive allegedly did nothing to improve the situation.

Many aspects of the management of the MWU were also seriously questioned. Under the leadership of Charles Harris, the general secretary, the MWU was
“blatantly” corrupt and autocratic and perceived to be in league with the Chamber of Mines. Incompetent union officials were appointed in management positions, which they allegedly also obtained irregularly. Furthermore, there were complaints about the manipulation of elections for union officials, ballot rigging and illegal representation on the MWU general council by unauthorized outsiders. The ABM, however, was neither well-organized, nor could it must a substantial following to challenge the MWU’s position as an alternative miners’ union. The ABM organizers, all Afrikaner miners, were hampered by a lack of recruitment funds. Consequently, the NRT obtained some funds from a few well-off Afrikaner individuals, while Herzog launched a fundraising campaign to mobilize rural Afrikaner capital to relieve the distress of their urban brethren and inform them of the latter’s struggle in the trade unions. The rural excursions not only provided the ABM with badly needed funds, but also created a spiritual bond and understanding between rural Afrikaners and the urban Afrikaner working class. However, the ABM had to face formidable opponents as it was initially perceived as an actual threat to the vested interests and position of the MWU and the Chamber of Mines. The MWU’s general secretary, Charles Harris, severely attacked the ABM, accusing it of Afrikaner exclusivity and self-interest. The Chamber, while supporting the MWU’s criticism, described the ABM as an effort by the GNP to promote a class struggle. The SALP, while promising its full support to the MWU and advising miners to join the organization without delay, vehemently denounced the idea of a separate Afrikaner trade union as a political ploy by the AB. The T&LC, in turn, compared the ABM with trade unions that were established in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

In an effort to thwart the ABM’s challenge to its existence, the MWU pressured the Chamber of Mines to reintroduce the closed shop agreement in June 1937 (the agreement was originally annulled by the Chamber after the 1922 strike). This step had serious consequences for the ABM. The practical implications of the agreement were that white underground miners were forced to join the MWU as the only union officially recognized by the Chamber and pay their union dues. If they refused, the Chamber of Mines reserved the rights to suspend them completely from the mining industry. This reintroduction of the closed shop agreement was a victory for the MWU and the ABM (temporarily) sounded the retreat in its efforts to Afrikanerize the mineworkers’ union.

Although the ABM theoretically disbanded in June 1937, its adherents, in conjunction with the NRT, were still determined to fight Charles Harris and the officials of the MWU. According to their new strategy, all ABM members were to join the MWU and reform the latter from within. In this way the ABM would continue its efforts to obtain a majority vote in the general council of the MWU, while functioning non-officially as a separate group within the miners’ union.

In October 1938 a new organization, the Reformers’ Organization, or Reformers, was founded within the MWU. Its head committee consisted of 16 miners and an executive of members, with the NRT’s omnipresent Albert Hertzog as chairperson. Membership was open to all white underground miners who endorsed its principles. Its most important objective was to reform the MWU constitutionally from within and to transform it into an Afrikaans-speaking Christian-national trade union by taking over the MWU management.
The struggle continued when the Reformers accused the MWU of corrupt practices during World War Two. In particular, in the elections for the post of general secretary, held in March 1940 after the assassination of Charles Harris by a young Afrikaner miner (not connected with the Reformers), it resorted to ill-concealed ballot rigging. When the Reformers threatened to react to this move with a war-time strike, the state became compelled to intervene and appoint a Commission of Inquiry. The commission acknowledged the existence of corrupt practices and made some recommendations for modification of these practices. These included the removal from office and prosecution of Jan Kukkuk, the MWU’s candidate, who was replaced by Bertram B. Broderick.

But Broderick was unpopular and regarded by many as dictatorial. In 1943 he negotiated a wage increase of 30 per cent on behalf of the MWU with the Gold Producers’ Committee (GPC) – the executive of the Chamber of Mines. This was, however, rapidly withdrawn in return for an annual payment to the union of £100 000 for five years by the GPC for housing and other cooperative schemes to be agreed upon between the GPC and the MWU. The MWU leadership agreed to submit no further wage demands unless “existing conditions should change very materially”. The farms purchased with this grant were rapidly bankrupted.

Naturally, the miners were bitterly disappointed by the lack in wage increases and became incensed at what was regarded as the MWU’s capitulation to mining capital. The situation was aggravated as the War Measures Act No. 29 of 1940, which stipulated that no elections for the MWU executive would be held during the war and up to six months after hostilities had been ceased, had still not repealed by 1946. Consequently, the seething discontent among the miners erupted in a general strike in 1946.

By this time the Reformers were only one of several groups of miners who agitated against the MWU executive. During the 1946 strike a so-called Protesting Miners’ Committee was also established. Although many protesting miners shared the Reformers’ dissatisfaction with the MWU executive, they did not want to associate themselves with the Reformers. The 1940 Commission of Inquiry came to the conclusion that the Reformers’ motives were harmful to the interests of the miners and the mining industry and that they were driven by interests outside of the industry, such as the NRT. Clearly by 1946 the Reformers were no longer the only miners’ organization prepared to take on the MWU executive.

According to the terms of settlement of the 1946 strike, the government agreed to another Commission of Inquiry into the affairs of the MWU. However, while the commission was still conducting its inquiry events took an unexpected turn when Broderick was discharged from his position as general secretary by a MWU general council meeting. As result 13 of the 19 members of the MWU’s executive also resigned. Apparently Broderick’s autocratic behavior and his poor handling of the MWU’s affairs had taken their toll.

When elections for a new post-war MWU executive were finally set for July 1946, there was intensive lobbying for votes. On the one side was Broderick and his adherents, and on the other all the protesting factions, which grouped themselves
into the United Mineworkers’ Committee (UMC). But when election irregularities among shaft stewards led to disputes and the 1946 Commission of Inquiry’s arbitration of the matter thwarted the UMC’s chances to obtain a majority vote in the MWU’s general council, another miners’ strike broke out in January 1947.\textsuperscript{88}

The strike, which ended only in March 1947, had substantial repercussions. There was overwhelming support for the strike, especially from Afrikaner miners, but also from a section of English-speaking miners. According to Linda de Kock, the success of the 1947 strike was a resounding victory for the UMC. Eventually in November 1948, six months after the GNP’s victory in the 1948 general election, the UMC, consisting of a strong core of Reformers, finally gained control of the MWU management. In the November elections for shaft stewards the UMC won 187 seats out of 195 and 35 UMC members out of a total of 49 were also elected to the MWU’s general council. In addition, Daan Ellis, an ex-Reformer, was elected as the union’s new general secretary.\textsuperscript{89} Thus the long struggle for the complete Afrikanerization of the mineworkers’ union was finally concluded successfully.

D Coming to grips with white political hegemony – The phenomenon of Afrikaner nationalism

The Afrikaners’ advent to political hegemony during the 1930s and 1940s has intrigued many 20th-century scholars and produced a plethora of studies by revisionists, liberals and socialists in an attempt to analyze and explain the historical phenomenon of Afrikaner nationalism and the position of the urban Afrikaner working class in the mobilization of Afrikaner nationalism.

According to Dan O’Meara’s economic studies, hailed by many scholars as some of the most authoritative structural analyses on the subject of Afrikaner nationalism, the attempts at the Afrikanerization of the MWU and the organization of Afrikaner miners on Christian-national principles, formed an integral part of the Afrikaner cultural entrepreneurs’ strategy to mobilize Afrikaner workers in the organic identity of a monolithic Afrikanerdom. It was thus in the 1930s that a fully urbanized Afrikaner nationalism set about mobilizing the Afrikaner working class for the purposes of ethnic capital formation. Central to the nationalist mobilization of the entire \textit{Afrikanervolk} (Afrikaner people) were what O’Meara identifies as the “petty bourgeois” Afrikaner professionals and intellectuals within the AB. This petty bourgeoisie identified British imperialism and “foreign” capitalism in South Africa as the source of discrimination against and subsequent economic immobility of Afrikaners. To overcome these economic impediments the AB-dominated petty bourgeoisie had to form anti-imperialist class alliances with all sectors of Afrikanerdom. Therefore the AB became involved in addressing urban issues. Poor whiteism and the position of Afrikaners generally were regarded as urban rather than rural phenomena and the solution lay in Afrikaner ownership of the structure of the industrial economy.

O’Meara argues that the mines were the second largest employers, after the railroads, of Afrikaner workers by the 1930s. For two reasons Afrikaner workers, and miners in particular, were an essential tool in the mobilization strategies of the Afrikaner cultural brokers - something which O’Meara perceives as entailing a “cynical manipulation” of miners’ grievances against the hopelessly corrupt MWU for
petty bourgeois ends. Firstly, the cultural brokers were convinced that Afrikaner workers displayed an “unhealthy” attraction to “foreign” class organizations, such as the traditional trade unions and the SALP, run by “foreign” leaders in an “unholy” alliance with “foreign” capitalists designed to line the pockets of both. The “foreign” and “communistic” labor leaders were also imbued with the “cancerous” ideology of class.

Given the existence of a large group of urban poor whites, there was a real danger that they could be mobilized along class lines, thereby undermining any potential mass base for Afrikaner nationalism. Therefore Afrikaner workers had to be “rescued” from the un-nationalistic power of the English-dominated labor organizations and thus “saved” for the organic unity of the Afrikanervolk and mobilized in cultural terms. Furthermore, by mobilizing and securing the material basis of Afrikaner workers, they would not only be “rescued” from poor whiteism and from their least-skilled, lowest-paid roles in industry, but also from “foreign” and “communistic” labor leaders, who sought to replace them with cheap African labor, forcing them back into the morass of poor whiteism.

Secondly, O’Meara argues that the mobilization of Afrikaner workers became the sine qua non of Afrikaner nationalist political and economic power and the development of Afrikaner capital. The nature of white industrial employment on the mines changed. In the 1920s an English-orientated, craft union-dominated division of labor prevailed. By the 1930s the roles of these craft unionists changed to those of supervisors. Therefore the process of secondary industrialization and the industrial unionism of the MWU, as the only non-craft mining union, provided less-skilled Afrikaner miners with opportunities to raise their status to supervisors of (black) labor, which in turn improved their material conditions. According to O’Meara, the status of these Afrikaner miners, as part of the new petty bourgeoisie, particularly attracted the NRT. The savings of Afrikaner workers, such as the Afrikaner miners within the MWU, were to provide an important source of capital for the Afrikaner economic movement. It was thus important that they be weaned from the ideological and organizational hold of class groupings and so contribute to an Afrikaner volkskapitalisme (people’s capitalism) that would eventually replace imperial and foreign capitalism and empower Afrikanerdom economically.90

According to Dunbar Moodie, the centenary celebrations of the Great Trek in 1938 provided a huge cultural impetus for Afrikaner nationalism and the eventual Afrikanerization of the MWU executive in 1948. The AB was convinced that the problems of urban Afrikaner poverty were to be solved by organizing and mobilizing Afrikaner workers in the cities via Christian-national labor unions into the organic unity of the volk – a strategy that would protect their right to existence against labor competition with blacks. Since communism advocated racial equality and disregarded racial differences, which posed a threat to Afrikaner ethnic existence, the NP were to be the agent to unite the multiple anti-communist forces within Afrikanerdom in support of a single anti-communist organization (the party itself).91

William Vatcher, who erroneously attempts to equate the Afrikaner nationalism of the 1930s and 1940s with Hitler’s Nazism,92 asserts that the problem of urbanized poor whites was a significant factor in the development of nationalism by Afrikaner Nationalist leaders. Consequently, efforts were made to improve the position of the
poor whites, to develop in them a heightened sense of their identity as part of the Afrikaner people, and to prevent their absorption into an undifferentiated proletariat.\textsuperscript{93}

Isabel Hofmeyr thinks that, since the intellectual Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie were being financially cast off by the wealthy Afrikaner landed gentry in the wake of the Anglo-Boer War, they could only appeal to populist support to back their class base materially. This populist support was found among the Afrikaner poor and in the broader movement of “moralizing” the poor in the cities, in welfare work of ministry to the poor and fashioning them into workers. Therefore Hofmeyr argues that the process of becoming a worker was the process of being made into an Afrikaner. The Afrikaner intelligentsia had an overriding interest in creating Afrikaner workers who would refill Afrikaner churches, attend Afrikaner schools and buy Afrikaner books, thus preventing the marginalization of the Afrikaner petty bourgeois class.\textsuperscript{94}

Many findings by revisionist scholars, such as O’Meara and others on Afrikaner nationalism and the mobilization of the Afrikaner working class were based on the earlier publications of labor and socialist personalities from the trade union movement – some of whom were the victims of Nationalist laws and labor policies. They also launched virulent attacks upon aspects of Afrikaner nationalism and its Christian-nationalist labor doctrine.

Alex Hepple, the SALP parliamentary leader in the 1950s asserted that Afrikaner workers “had been entangled in the meshes of all the social and cultural offshoots of the \textit{Broederbond}” and that the AB’s cultural and economic front organizations launched “an all-out attack” upon the traditional trade unions, such as the MWU, “to undermine and destroy” them. For Hepple, the interference by Afrikaner cultural entrepreneurs “brought nothing but division to workers’ organizations.” Because members of the MWU were predominantly Afrikaans-speaking and closely attached to their church they were “easily influenced” by “Christian-National propaganda” and the “fanaticism” of Albert Hertzog.\textsuperscript{95}

The views on Afrikaner nationalism expressed by Solly Sachs, former general secretary of the Garment Workers’ Union of South Africa, who were persecuted by the NP government for alleged communist activities in the early 1950s, concur with those of Hepple. Sachs held that the mobilization of Afrikaner workers under the guise of advocating Christian-nationalism was essential to canvass political support for the NP in order to take control of the government in a general election. Therefore the MWU became a mere “political football” of the NP.\textsuperscript{96}

\section*{E Material and cultural considerations of the Afrikaner urban working class – Towards a new synthesis}

The above analyses and discussions on the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism and the mobilization of the Afrikaner working class, however, did not succeed in explaining the actions of Afrikaner workers in ethnic terms convincingly. For one, they only took scant and partial cognizance of the different historiographic perspectives presented in Afrikaans literature on the struggle of (especially poor) Afrikaners to establish and maintain their cultural identity in an alien urban environment. As their point of departure these studies conspicuously argue that Afrikaner nationalism was instigated and controlled by the petty bourgeois Afrikaner
intellectual clique through the strategies of elite-driven organizations such as the AB, the NRT and the NP – thus a monolithic ethnic block with a presumably inherent organic unity.\textsuperscript{97} Therefore, the impression is created that the Afrikaner working class only reacted to the impulses and directives of the petty bourgeois elite as willing and docile tools to dutifully execute their obligations to realize the latter’s master plan for Afrikanerdom. Thus the assumption is that urban Afrikaner workers had no class considerations of their own that determined their reaction or allegiance to ethnic mobilization.

But recent studies on organized dog racing as a leisure pursuit, particularly of the urban Afrikaner working class, and on the differing perceptions of the Great Trek anniversaries among various Afrikaner interest groups suggest that the class interests of the working classes and the middle classes did not always coincide. Albert Grundlingh argues that elements of the leisure-time pursuit of the highly popular dog racing attractions among the Afrikaner working class reveal the development of inherent class dynamics. By the 1930s Afrikaner workers were not entirely hapless victims of forces beyond their control in an alien urban environment who had to be saved from un-nationalistic “vices” as perceived by the petty bourgeois cultural brokers, such as dog racing, which is of British origin. Rather the pursuit of dog racing reveals the underlying fissures in the process of creating what was considered a suitable Afrikaner culture. The Afrikaner poor did not necessarily share the same cultural concerns as their middle-class compatriots. Likewise, members of the Afrikaner middle classes became increasingly aware of a growing social divide between them and the working classes as the cleavages between the material interests of the various groups grew.\textsuperscript{98}

Similarly, Grundlingh and Hilary Sapire argue that the Afrikaner working classes and middle classes perceived Great Trek anniversaries differently. For a vulnerable and marginalized Afrikaner poor such celebrations served as a spiritual and cultural balm for their economic woes and insecurities. They felt increasingly betrayed and deserted by the elitism of urban middle-class Afrikanerdom, whose taste for cultural inspiration and revival at Afrikaner festivals seemed to have diminished and whose economic and social embourgeoisment since the 1960s excluded their poorer compatriots.\textsuperscript{99}

Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the NP sponsored a commission that was to investigate the feasibility of an all-Afrikaner miners’ union apart from the MWU, which eventually led to the formation of the \textit{Zuid-Afrikaanse Werkers Bond} in 1917. In addition, the Cape Town-based pro-Nationalist organ, \textit{De Burger}, preached unity between rural and urban Afrikaners to prevent them from falling prey to the capitalist class or to un-nationalistic labor organizations. But as early as 1920 already the same paper prophetically speculated that the day might soon arrive when the material interests of the Afrikaner working class and those of other Afrikaner classes would diverge, which could in turn dissolve Afrikaner volkseenheid (people’s unity).\textsuperscript{100}

O’Meara and others concede that by the late 1930s and early 1940s the economic position of Afrikaner workers, and therefore also their material basis, had been improved considerably due to wartime industrial expansion. By then the poor white problem had been largely overcome. This was an indication that Afrikaner workers were adapting to urban conditions.\textsuperscript{101} It also suggests that the more secure their
material basis became in this period, the more confident these workers became in pursuing their own class interests per se, often independently and not always in tandem with the designs and strategies of the Afrikaner petty bourgeois cultural entrepreneurs. The intelligentsia wanted an ordered and hierarchical world. But it was not quite the world which Afrikaner workers wanted nor did bourgeois values hold much appeal for them. O’Meara aptly puts it that workers cared more about their wage packet and about their other material interests than they cared about ideology.

A scrutiny of the Minutes of Evidence pertaining to the 1940 Commission of Inquiry into the affairs of the MWU reveals perhaps the most evident examples of Afrikaner working-class dynamics. Clearly, for many Reformers material considerations were of primary concern in their reformist zeal. Firstly, from their point of view issues such as the “specter” of communism, the “menace” of racial equality with blacks and the dilution of the ranks of white labor due to an influx of African labor, which they perceived to be associated with communism, served as important motives for the formation of the Reformers’ Organization. For these miners the preservation of the color bar in the mining industry was a fundamental principle. This concurs with O’Meara’s conclusion that material factors, rather than the innate susceptibility of Afrikaner miners to the appeals of Christian-nationalism, explain the Reformers’ successful takeover of the MWU.

The lack of administrative skills to run the affairs of a trade union properly, rather than an overwhelming loyalty to the ideals of Afrikaner nationalism, also seems to have been an important reason why Afrikaner miners were willing to accept assistance from outside the traditional labor movement and why the ABM and the Reformers’ Organization were launched by the NRT, an organization of the intellectual elite.

Furthermore, the Minutes of Evidence reveal that not all Afrikaners were ABM members or Reformers, nor were they all Nationalists. Both organizations included a number of English-speaking supporters. The membership of these organizations also included supporters of the SALP, the UP and loyalists who participated in the UP government’s war effort in North Africa on behalf of Britain and her allies. One witness even alleged that a “communistically inclined” miner, Charlie Langeveld, was a Reformer.

Thus, these arguments seem to refute the claims that all Afrikaner workers, and miners in particular, were susceptible pawns in the ethnic mobilization strategies of the cultural brokers, or that they necessarily regarded themselves as an integral part of the organic unity of a monolithic Afrikanerdom. Neither does the evidence suggest that reformist organizations, such as the ABM and the Reformers’ Organization, were exclusively used for political or ethnic purposes by the miners themselves. Both organizations included members who were not staunch NP supporters or even Afrikaans speakers. Therefore, the evidence supports the argument that for many Afrikaner miners class and material considerations carried more weight than Afrikaner nationalist and ethnic considerations. Indeed, in his study on the social and economic history of the Witwatersrand between 1886 and 1914 Van Onselen vividly illustrates the staunch political independence of the early Afrikaner working
class and the futile attempts by Afrikaner and labor political parties to capture and hold the allegiance of these workers.\textsuperscript{111}

Apart from material interests, the Afrikaner working class also revealed the need to preserve a distinctive Afrikaner cultural identity amidst the prevailing cosmopolitan socio-economic conditions on the Witwatersrand gold fields. Although O’Meara claims that Afrikaner workers displayed scant interest in the culture and politics of the \textit{volk} (people) - mainly as a result of the poor white problem\textsuperscript{112} - numerous Afrikaner histories tell of an Afrikaner proletariat with its rural background which had to assert itself in an urban environment that was predominantly alien and hostile to Afrikaner cultural traditions and the Afrikaans language.\textsuperscript{113}

Afrikaner working-class organizations initially had relatively little cultural ethnic appeal, but over time managed to impart more of a cultural dimension. Perhaps this coincided with the number of English-speaking miners pegged at the same level, which allowed for the growth of Afrikaner parity.

Indeed, the aims of the 1917 \textit{Zuid-Afrikaanse Werkers Bond} were to protect the cultural and language interests of the Afrikaner miners against the dominating British-orientated spirit that prevailed in the MWU at that time\textsuperscript{114} - thus nineteen years before the NRT attempted to mobilize Afrikaner workers for ethnic and nationalist purposes. In addition, the evidence from the 1940 Commission of Inquiry into the affairs of the MWU clearly reveals, as far as ordinary Afrikaner miners were concerned, that the ABM and the Reformers’ Organization served as urban cultural havens for those newly proletarianized workers who managed to secure employment on the mines. They harbored a fair amount of distrust of the leadership of the existing trade unions, such as the executive of the MWU. Thus S.S. Schoeman, a Reformer and former ABM member, testified before the Commission:

"...these men all of a sudden find themselves in a strange environment under conditions which are strange to them and they are practically lost. That is the state of affairs and if one understands that one can realise how it was that the Afrikanerbond of Myn Workers (sic) came into being."\textsuperscript{115}

Therefore it seems clear that as far as the cultural interests of Afrikaner miners were concerned, two considerations are at stake. On the one hand, there were those members of the ABM and the Reformers’ Organization who strove as bona fide miners towards creating a-political\textsuperscript{116} labor organizations that would also cater for the cultural needs of Afrikaner workers. These miners followed in the tradition of their predecessors who organized the short-lived \textit{Zuid-Afrikaanse Werkers Bond} in 1917 and the \textit{Suid-Afrikaanse Werkersunie} in 1922. In the light of this argument O’Meara’s assertion that the majority of Afrikaner workers made no attempt to organize themselves along Christian-national lines by the 1930s is partly correct.\textsuperscript{117}
On the other hand, it is also quite evident that the Afrikaner petty bourgeois cultural brokers in the AB and the NRT had their own nationalist designs for the Afrikaner working class as part of their strategy for the ethnic mobilization of the whole of Afrikanerdom. Therefore it must be conceded that certain ABM members and Reformers not only enthusiastically supported these aims on ideological grounds, but also took an active part in the NRT’s efforts.\(^{118}\)

The eventual Afrikanerization of the MWU can also be regarded as an attempt by a fraction of the Afrikaner working class to escape poor whiteism by strengthening their material basis and consequently establishing for themselves a distinct cultural niche and Afrikaner working class cultural identity in an English-dominated urban environment.

F Conclusion

This paper does not attempt to refute the earlier arguments on Afrikaner nationalism and ethnic mobilization. It concedes that many reformist-orientated Afrikaner workers’ interests either corresponded with those of the middle-class Afrikaner cultural brokers in organizations such as the AB and the NRT, or they were caught up in the ethnic mobilization strategies of the latter two organizations. These strategies were intended to purify the MWU of a volksvreemde (alien to the people) orientation and make it an obedient servant of Afrikaner nationalism. But on the other hand, this paper strongly suggests that, in the light of Afrikaner miners’ distinct material and cultural interests, the position of the Afrikaner working class in relation to Afrikaner nationalism and ethnic mobilization should be seriously reconsidered. The evidence clearly indicates that Afrikaner-orientated organizations, such as the ABM and the Reformers’ Organization, displayed more of their own initiative than is generally recognized and people like Albert Hertzog and the NP drew on this initiative rather than created it.

What is quite evident is the fact that the Afrikaner working class emerged as a consequence of urbanization. In other words, without industrialization and the subsequent urbanization of the South African economy, a distinct Afrikaner working class probably never would have emerged.

As Lange states, much more comprehensive research is still needed on how Afrikaner ethnicity and cultural identity were experienced by ordinary people in their daily lives in an urban setting,\(^{119}\) as well as on the behavioural patterns of the Afrikaner working class in an urban environment. The history of the urbanization of Afrikaner mineworkers is a case in point.

\(^1\) Floris van Jaarsveld, Stedelike Geskiedenis as Navorsingsveld vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Historikus (Johannesburg:RAU Publikasiereeks B3, 1973),1.3.

\(^2\) Johannesburg: Central News Agency, Ltd., 1919.

\(^3\) See The Rise of the City (New York, 1933) and “The City in American History”, Mississippi Valley Historical Review 27 (1940).
4 Van Jaarsveld, Stedelike Geskiedenis, 6.

5 Stellenboch: Pro Ecclesia, 1932.

6 Van Jaarsveld, Stedelike Geskiedenis, 37.

7 Johannes Albertyn, ed., Die Stadwaartse Trek van die Afrikanernasie. Referate en Besluite van die Volkskongres (Johannesburg, 1947).


10 Van Jaarsveld, Stedelike Geskiedenis, 15-16.


12 Albertyn, Die Stadwaartse Trek, 96.


18 Van Onselen, New Babylon, 2-8.

19 Floris van Jaarsveld, Die Afrikaners se Groot Trek, 167.


21 Stals, Afrikaners in die Goudstad. Deel II, 10.

22 Abel Coetzee, Die Opkoms van die Afrikaanse Kultuurgedigte aan die Rand 1886-1936 (Johannesburg: Afrikaanse Pers Beperk, 1936?), 324. See also Sarel van Wyk, Die Afrikaner in die Beroepslewe van die Stad (Pretoria: Academica, 1968), 32.

24 Ibid., 137, 167.

25 According to Lis Lange, *White, Poor and Angry. White working class families in Johannesburg* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 72 the term “poor whites” refers to unskilled workers, largely of Afrikaner descent, who were especially exposed to prolonged periods of unemployment and/or could not find employment due to the racial division of the labor market that characterized South Africa at the turn of the 20th century. See also Robert Morrell, ed., *White but Poor. Essays on the History of Poor Whites in Southern Africa 1880-1940* (Pretoria: Unisa, 1992), 1-2.


40 Van Onselen, *New Nineveh*, 142.


49 Lange, *White, Poor and Angry*, 76.


52 Morrell, *White but Poor*, 12.

This argument refutes the assertions of Abel Coetzee, *Die Afrikaanse Volkskultuur. ‘n Inleiding tot die Studie van Volkskunde* (Cape Town: A.A. Balkema, 1953), 125 and Fourie, “Die Vraag na en Aanbod,” 152 that there was a lack of class-consciousness within the ranks of urbanizing Afrikanerdom.


Quoted by Pauw, *Die Beroepsarbeid van die Afrikaner*, 207.


Lange, *White, Poor and Angry*, 113. It should, however, be emphasized that Lange’s work has more of a community approach towards formal labor organizations.

71 Naudé, Dr. A. Hertzog, 27.

72 Adriaan Pelzer, Die Afrikaner-Broederbond: Eerste 50 Jaar (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1979), 150; O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme, 63. The AB was founded in Johannesburg in 1918 by middle-class Afrikaner intelligentsia who were concerned about their economic prospects because they believed that cultural and spiritual development was not possible without positive economic prospects.


74 Van Aswegen and De Kock, “Afrikanermynwerkers, I,” 21, 24. In 1934 the United Party was formed by the fusion of the original NP of General Hertzog and General Smuts's South African Party. Afrikaner dissidents who could not agree with the terms of fusion broke off to form the GNP under Daniël Malan. See also Grundlingh, “Afrikaner Nationalism,” 276.


76 Van Aswegen and De Kock, “Afrikanermynwerkers, I,” 22-3; Naudé, Dr. A. Hertog, 16-27; Albertyn, Die Stadwaartse Trek, 8,97.

77 CAD, K6, Band 4, File VI: Final Reports, Findings & Recommendations, 2-7, 14.

78 Ibid., 15-6; Van Aswegen and De Kock, “Afrikanermynwerkers, I,” 25-6, 29; Naudé, Dr. A. Hertzog, 28-31, 34, 96-7, 99-100.

79 Van Aswegen and De Kock, “Afrikanermynwerkers, II,” 27-8; Naudé, Dr. A. Hertzog, 41-2.


82 Naudé, Dr. A. Hertzog, 128-9.

83 See CAD, K6, Band 4, File VI: Final Reports, Findings & Recommendations, 1-10, 58-73.

84 CAD, MWU Inquiry Commission 1946-1948 (hereafter K145), Band 1, Vol. 1: Minutes, 5; Ibid., Band 3, File III: Mine Workers Union, 1 and Memorandum of Agreement; CAD, A2, J.G. Strijdom Collection, Vol. 78: Mynwerkersgeskil, 88; TAD, A1731, S.J. Botha Collection, Vol. 7: SAMWU Verslag, Deel B, 4-5, 8.
85 CAD, K145, Band 3, File III: Mine Workers Union, 1; CAD, A2, J.G. Strijdom Collection, Vol. 78: Mynwerkersgeskil, 88, 97; TAD, A1731, S.J. Botha Collection, Vol. 7: SAMWU Verslag, Deel B, 8; Naudé, Dr. A. Hertzog, 209.


89 De Kock, “Die Stryd van die Afrikaner,” 204-30, 249-53; Naudé, Dr. A. Hertzog, 253-54. See also O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme, 91.


93 Vatcher, White Laager, 50.


95 Alex Hepple, Trade Unions in Travail (Johannesburg: Prompt Printing Co. (Pty.) Ltd, 1953?), 5-46.


102 Hofmeyr, “Building a Nation from Words,” 103. See also Lange, *White, Poor and Angry*, 168.


104 O’Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 165.

105 CAD, K6, Band 2, Vol. 8: S.S. Schoeman testifies (8 November 1940), 542; Ibid., Vol. 9: S.S. Schoeman testifies (12 November 1940), 565-6, 582; Ibid., Vol. 10: J. S. de Wet testifies (13 November 1940), 668-9, 647-5; Ibid., Vol. 11: J.S. de Wet testifies (14 November 1940), 778-84.

106 O’Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, 90, 93-4; O’Meara, “White Trade Unionism,” 46.


109 Ibid., Vol. 25: J.A. van den Bergh testifies (12 December 1940), 2090-91. According to Naudé, *Dr. A. Hertzog*, 37,39, Langevelt was an English-speaking supporter of the Reformers.


112 O’Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, 71.
See e.g. Stals, Afrikaners in die Goudstad. Deel II, 5, 13, 29, 49-50; Van Jaarsveld, Die Afrikaners se Groot Trek, 148 et seq.; Pauw, Die Beroepsarbeid van die Afrikaner, 62 et seq.; Van Wyk, Die Afrikaner in die Beroepslewe, 29, 35, 224-8; Albertyn, Kerk en Stad, 29 et seq.; Eben du Plessis, 'n Volk Staan Op, 32; Van Jaarsveld, Stedelike Geskiedenis, 56; Albertyn, Die Stadwaartse Trek, 6-8, 62, 92-93; Johannes D. Kestell, My Nasie in Nood (Bloemfontein: Nasionale Pers Bpk., 1940), 50-1.


O’Meara, “White Trade Unionism,” 37. O’Meara also erroneously asserts that these workers made no attempt to organize themselves along cultural lines.

See Naudé, Dr. A. Hertzog, 28, et. seq.

Lange, White, Poor and Angry, 167.